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PROOF OF SERVICE ACCORDING TO PRISONER MAIL BOX RULE

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Department of Justice
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This service contained the following ;

Entry of objection
Courts denial of expansion

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ACCORDING TO THE PRISONER MAIL BOX RULE

THIS SERVICE IS CONSIDERED FILED ON THE DATE OF THE SERVICE

UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY

The forgoing of this proof of service is the truth to the best and direct knowledge of;

John Henry Yablonsky

2/11/15
Date

My address is Box 8500 Coalinga, Ca.93210

1 John Henry Yablonsky AL-0373
2 Box 8500
3 Coalinga, Ca. 93210
4
5
6

7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 John Henry Yablonsky,
10 Petitioner,

EDCV 14-01877-PA(DTB)

11 vs.

ENTRY OF OBJECTION 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
COURTS DENIAL OF EXPANSION OF RECORD
PURSUANT TO HABEAS RULE 7 REQUEST

12 Scott Fraeunheim (warden)
13 Respondent,

Filed : september 4, 2014
The Honorable Magistrate D. Bristow

14 Enacted in 1966 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, congress
15 specified the [absence] of [factors] enumerated in 2254(d)(1-8)
16 the burden rests on petitioner....to establish "by convincing
17 fact s and evidence that the factual determination of state court's
18 was erroneous"....Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1998)
19 However when petitioner seekd to expand for reasons as to cure
20 the [ommissions] in the state court regarding records. See Dpbbs
21 V. Zant (1993) 506 U.S. 156; People v. Linden (1959) 52 Cal 1, also
22 concurring opinions Justice Goldberg in Hardy v. United States (1964)
23 375 U.S. 877.

24 The Magistrates Act's and habeas rules ambiguity and
25 the severe consequences of a failure to object give parties little
26 choice but to object in comprehensive manner to any respect of
27 the Magistrate Judges report or ordered denials that is by itself

Objection 1



1 objectionable or that it does or could contribute to an objectionable
2 fact-finding, legal conclusion, or disposition. *McKeever v. Block*, 932
3 F.2d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 1991).

4 Petitioner requested expansion of the records in the early fact-
5 finding phase of the petition based off the Attorney General's
6 repeated denials in petitioner's claims throughout the entire
7 petition and brief filed by petitioner, declaring,

8 (Attorney General's answer, from here forward [R.A.])

9 (RA:26-9) "On claims fairly presented to state court, petitioner
10 fails to prove their rejection either was not on the merits, or
11 the merits rejection was objectively unreasonable. 28 USC §2254(d)."

12 (RA2:10-15) "Petitioner shows no lawful basis to issue the writ
13 under a system of review already "secondary" and "limited" prior
14 to 1996, *Barefoot v. Estelle*, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77
15 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), and now further "limited rather than expanded"
16 under the AEDPA of 1996, *Fry v. Pliler*, 551 US 112 (2007), and the
17 petition must be denied.

18 (RA32:18-23) (Regarding the recording transcript)

19 "Moreover, it is simply wrong. The only transcript utilized at
20 trial was that of petitioner's interview with the detectives Alexander,
21 and Myler. This was shown to the jurors by way of the overhead
22 projector during playback of the [inter]view and a hard copy
23 was provided to assist the jurors' deliberations. Though not formally
24 admitted into evidence, it was designated as exhibit 49(a) and
25 appears as such in the clerk's transcripts.

26 Here the exhibit 49(a) that was placed into the records was
27 only 113 pages in length (hard copy) while the state's exhibit

Objection 2

1 49 the actual disc of the recording ,both of which are in
2 the petitioners habeas exhibits 2, and neither are what was
3 played to the jury, while the disc shows over three hours
4 and 48 minutes, and states minute record of that day show,
5 only one hour and fifty five minutes played to the jury.
6 Which is against state Penal code section 1401(B)(1) for authenticat
7 tions ,and Rules of Federal Rules of evidence 901(a)(7)(A) and
8 1002, Strickler v. Greene (1999) 5 U.S. 263; Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514
9 US. 419; See also Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
10 (RA41:21-24) "The court denied the claim because petitioner failed
11 to show there was false evidence. Rather, there might have been
12 inconsistencies in testimony, but such inconsistencies did not
13 amount to false evidence.

14 Where here the state court claimed lack of jurisdiction on
15 this ground, but this was after transcripts were requested
16 several times, and denied, and the trial attorney had not
17 provided the remainder of the discovery in this case, which
18 on their face do make clear and fair showing the testimonies
19 were perjured, or subpoenaed,
20 Shih wei su v. Fillion, 335 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2003); Napue v. Illinois,
21 136 U.S. 264 (1959).

22 (RA64:2-6) (The desk blotter)

23 "Petitioner has failed to show even if there was DNA it was viable
24 and that it showed it belonged to another person. Third, that even
25 if there was another person's DNA on a desk blotter, that does
26 not show that the person was linked to a murder since there is
27 nothing to indicate when that DNA was placed on the blotter"

28 Here this evidence was capable of showing that any other
29 DNA located on this item, was on it for longer or shorter
30 periods of time through PCR analysis, and being the petitioners
31 DNA located inside the victim that had been inside there
32 for at least one and a half full days to several days before
33 she was killed does create [T] hird party culpable elements.

Objection 3))



1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); California v. Trombetta,
2 467 U.S. 479 (1984)

3 Where here the evidence had been destroyed, and what ever is left
4 was never examined, and certainly if the DNA that is located on
5 this item, comes back matching Gregory Randolph AKA William Backhoff
6 or anyone else established relevance and credibility factors that
7 are considered in third party culpability requirements.

8 (RA65:17-22) (' watch pin)

9 "Petitioner has failed to show there was actual DNA on the watch pin
10 to test. He also fails to show that if there was something to
11 test, it would have shown who this other person was. Additionally, even
12 if there was another persons DNA on the watch pin, that does not
13 show that the person was linked to ^a murder since there is nothing
14 to indicate when the DNA was put on the watch pin, or that the
15 victim may have found the watch pin and kept it."

16 This pin was used in the trial and shown as proof of the
17 struggle, and was located on a the sheets right next to
18 the victims body, where everything about this crime indicated
19 there was severe struggled activity. And certainly of the
20 pin tests with anyone's DNA other than the petitioner,
21 it established exculpat^{ing} factors of Third Party. PCR analysis
22 can determine the presence and length of time of it existence.

23 (RA67:24-26) (The red hair with root bulb attached)

24 "There was apparently no physical evidence that linked Backhoff
25 to the murder scene, and the claimed DNA connection was not sub-
26 stantiated by the information petitioner provided."

27 Where here William Backhoffs DNA was. located in the dining

Objection 4



1 Where here, not only what this witness was willing to
2 lie to the jury about, a report she has made of an alleged
3 prior rape by her fiance Yablonsky while he lived in the ir
4 home, but this lie was held over petitioner as a threat
5 of what they would present to the jury should He testify
6 of the facts regarding his relationship with the alleged
7 victim Rita Cobb. There was an investigation by counsel
8 Hal Smith who did investigate and did speak to David Sanders
9 about the investigations, and after thorough investigations
10 on Smiths behalf, he injected the failure to investigate
11 this witness, and even commented on the incompetance of
12 the trial attorney to announce trial readiness the day
13 after receiving contact information on Lori. Amaro. WITHOUT CONTACT
14 There was a certified questionnaire that was served to the
15 attorney, who chose to not comment.

16 Discovery of this attornbey's failure to investigate was purged
17 from his possession through Penal Code 1054.9.

18 Strickland v. Washington (citation ommitted) Rompilla v. Beard (2005)
19 545 U.S. 374, Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 602, 803(6)(A)(B)(C)
20 (RA85:24-28) (The transcript played to the jury and placed into)
21 (The only transcript utilized at trial was that of petitioner's
22 interview with det. Alexander and Myler. This was shown to the jurors
23 by way of the overhead projector during playback of [the] interview,
24 and a hard copy was provided to assist to jurors deliberations.
25 Though not formally admmitted into evidence, it was (design[ed])
26 as exhibit 49(a), and appears as such in the Clerk's Transcript."

27 (RA86:12-14) "There is nothing in the record to show there were
any missing pages from the material in the transcript, or that
both sides colluded against petitioner. "

Here there exists three separate and different versions of the
transcript. FILED IN HABEAS EXHIBITS, AND THE DISC OF INTERROGATION

Objection 6

1 The following are quotes of the state officers on the Record.
2 (RT402:25-403:13) (Prosecutor)"No, I have to do it because I have
3 to ensure that everythings taken out that needs to be taken [out].
4 I don't want to leave that up to somebody else."
5 (prosecutor)"The only question I did have for Mr.Sanders is theres
6 reference at the end of the interview where Mr.Yablonsky is invoking
7)MIRANDA)."I was planning on taking that out"(Prosecutor)
8 "So I gotta go through everthing and find out where I got to cut
9 the interview out and make sure it_sounds [good] "

10 (RT508:22-509:4)

11 (Prosecutor)As far as the digital audio portion, have you had an
12 opportunity to review the transcript, along with the
13 recording, to ensure that it was [accurate[] ?

14 (Det. Alexander) Yes.

15 (Prosecutor)As far as exhibit 49A, which is the recording do you
16 believe that that's accurate to the [best] of your
17 ability ?

18 (Det.Alexander) Yes.

19 Then as the court had listened to what they were told was accurate
20 when it was [not], the courts interviened and gave a jury instruction.

21 (RT550:18-23) (the courts instruction)

22 "I havent been inthe 21st century for long yet, i'm kinda low tech.
23 generally. Remeber when you saw the transcript ? See it helps you
24 understand what's on the tape, but the recording media is the [
25 original]".

26 Here not only was the recording altered and presented to the jury
27 as [accutate[] and original [media], but the court took great interest
for the jurors to understand what the defendants answers were,
when the pretext in the conversations had been removed, and then
told to the jury they had not.

Objection 7



1 THE COURT WAS MOVED UNDER KEENEY V. TAMAYO-REYES, 504 U.S. 1, Rule 7

2 Justice O'Conner and Kennedy have suggested that the court
3 is, and should be, more willing to grant habeas corpus petit-
4 ioner leave to utilize effective and fact development proced-
5 ures that it is to recognize the cognizability of certain
6 kinds of legal claims."

7 We ought not to take steps which diminish the cognizability
8 hurdles, likelihood that those courts will base their legal
9 decisions on an accurate assessment of the [facts]"

10 (emphasis added)

11 Libbert in v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct.
12 3412 (2010) (applying Cooper-Smith v. Palmeteer, infra, to find rule
13 7 expansion of the record should have been allowed because of Libber-
14 ton" (exercise of diligence")

15
16 Here these expected results of the expansion request,
17 even with the states own admissions they may very well exist, could
18 and would have certainly carried heavy credibility on the courts
19 view of this entire case, and the evidences that were misinterpreted
20 or withheld and or hidden from the fact finders of the jury.

21 Petitioner has been lied to, admittedly through the:
22 evidence presented in the petitioners claim, that were not released
23 until after the appeal process had run it's course, and there is
24 nothing in this or any record they revealed the altered or hidden
25 material from the appellate attorneys thorough investigations of
26 this case, and certainly one that would argue merits of hearsay,
27 and courts direction to jurors without competent counsel present

Objection 8




1 or the courts abuse of discretions in ruling on motions, would
2 certainly have had an overwhelming and catastrophic interest in
3 the elements this expansion could and would have on the appellate
4 courts view in this case. But they were not. Because they were
5 withheld, and therefore the state record in egregiously misinterpreted,
6 and represented of the facts that directly and materially , and
7 therefore the petitioners right to appeal was crippled because
8 of the hidden factors of purchased witnesses, manufactured evidences
9 where answers in an interrogation were altered audio. and visually
10 for the jury that was to determine the value of the defendants
11 answers and their meanings in their considerations of the facts.

12 PETITIONER HUMBLY ENTERS AN OBJECTION
13 FOR FAILURE TO GRANT HABEAS RULE 7 EXPANSION OF THE RECORD
14

15
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20
21
22
23
24 Date

2/11/15

Respectfully,


John Henry Yablonsky

25
26
27
Objection 9



MIME-Version:1.0 From:cacd_ecfmail@cacd.uscourts.gov To:ecfnf@cacd.uscourts.gov Bcc: John Henry Yablonsky
AL-0373
PLEASANT VALLEY STATE PRISON (8500)
P.O. BOX 8500
COALINGA CA 93210

--Case Participants: David Delgado-Rucci (david.delgadorucci@doj.ca.gov, docketingsdawt@doj.ca.gov, monica.seda@doj.ca.gov), Kevin R Vienna (bonnie.peak@doj.ca.gov, docketingsdawt@doj.ca.gov, kevin.vienna@doj.ca.gov, michelle.renaud@doj.ca.gov, susan.volsky@doj.ca.gov), Judge Percy Anderson (crd_anderson@cacd.uscourts.gov, stephen_montes_kerr@cacd.uscourts.gov), Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow (crd_bristow@cacd.uscourts.gov)

--Non Case Participants:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Notice of Electronic Filing

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Case Name: John Henry Yablonsky v. S Fraeuheim

Case Number: 5:14-cv-01877-PA-DTB

Filer:

Document Number: 51

Docket Text:

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER [47] Motion for Leave by Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow. The Court has not requested an expansion of the record pursuant to Habeas Rule 7. As such, petitioner's Request is DENIED. MINUTES (dc)

5:14-cv-01877-PA-DTB Notice has been electronically mailed to:

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1 John Henry Yablonsky AL-0373
2 Box 8500
3 Coalinga, Ca. 93210
4
5
6

7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT, CENTRAL DIVISION

9 John Henry Yablonsky,
10 Petitioner,

EDCV 14-01877-PA(DTB)

MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO EXPAND
11 THE RECORD RULE 7 HABEAS CORPUS
12 § 2254 MEMORANDUM POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES.

13 vs

(see attachment of appointment)

14 Scott Fraeunheim(warden),
15 Respondent,

16 Filed ;September 4, 2014
The Honorable Magistrate D. Bristow

17 Federal habeas corpus often is prisoners last opportunity
18 to ensure that the process by which the state convicted and senten-
19 ced him accords with federal law; in capital cases, habeas corpus
20 almost always is the last meaningful chance to do so and , indeed,
21 to appeal to [any] judicial authority to spare the prisoner's life.

22 In all, and especially in capital, cases, therefore, counsel
23 bears the responsibility of ensuring that all reasonably available
24 avenues of legal redress are considered. This responsibility does
25 require counsel not only to explore thoroughly the legal bases
26 for petitioners claims, but also to take full advantage of the capa-
27 city of federal proceedings to develop the factual bases for the
claims.

Expansion 1

1 Justice O'Connor and Kennedy have suggested that
2 the court is, and should be, more willing to grant
3 habeas corpus petitioners leave to utilize effective
4 and fact development procedures that it is to
5 recognize the cognizability of certain kinds of
6 legal claims. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
7 1,19-20 (1992) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (Court's recent
8 cutting back on habeas corpus "all concern the
9 question whether federal court will consider the
10 merits of the claim, that is, whether the court
11 has the authority to upset a judgment affirmed
12 by direct appeal.... The question we are considering
13 here [the petitioner's rights to an evidentiary
14 hearing] is quite different. Here the Federal
15 District Court has already determined that it
16 will consider the claimed constitutional violation;
17 the only question is how the court will go about
18 it. When it comes to determining that it will allow
19 a hearing is to be held to resolve a claim that
20 is already properly before a court, the federalism
21 concerns underlying our procedural default cases
22 are diminished somewhat. By this point our concerns
23 is less with encroaching on the territorial of
24 the state courts than it is with managing the
25 territory of the federal courts in a manner that
26 will best implement our responsibility to consider
27 habeas petitions... Federalism, comity, and finality
are all advanced once relitigation [properly]
occurs....." id. at 24 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (Court's
recent decisions limit habeas corpus to "actions
which present questions federal courts are bound
to decide in order to protect constitutional rights.

We ought not to take steps which diminish
the cognizability hurdles, likelihood that those
courts will base their legal decisions on an accurate
assessment of the [facts]" (emphasis added)

1 In this view, "once [the cognizability hurdles]
2 have been surmounted—once a claim is properly
3 before the district court—a habeas petitioner
4 [should be treated].....like a civil litigant"
5 for the purposes of the "right to a hearing [or,
6 presumably, any other less intrusive fact-development
7 procedure] where [the procedure] is necessary
8 to prove the facts supporting his claim." id, at
9 14-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting.)

8 Here in petitioners habeas, petitioner makes colorable claims, if
9 true would inherently influence the courts to order an evidentiary
10 hearing on the matters set forth in the facts that would be developed
11 once the results of the fact-finding procedures have been conducted.

12 There exist numerous meritorious value in the result
13 of simple investigations, and when several factors in this discovery
14 flourish, any reasonable fact-finder would interpret the results
15 as critical and relevant to the conviction in question.

16 The following are matters that, if discovered, would
17 alter the opinions of any reasonable fact-finders reasoning.

18 A) The transcript recording that was [allegedly] played to
19 the jury over the courts audio system, and visually on the screen,

20 i) States exhibits 49 and 49A

21 ii) That was altered before being played to the jury, but the
22 jury was instructed that it was the [original media] and
23 an [accurate] copy from one to the other. (INCORRECTLY ADVISED)

24 iii) This version played to the jury is not like or [accurate]
25 to what was placed onto the records as exhibit 49 and 49A.

26 iv) This recording was altered erasing incriminating factors
27 of the state before being given to the defense.

v) Answers were altered from yes to no, and no to yes, or versions
of answers altering the parties who were speaking. This

wa

Expansion 3

1 was then played to the jury with the altered answers,
2 in an attempt to intrude on the opinions of the jurors
3 minds and about the answers and circumstances of the
4 defendants reasons for those answers.

4 vi) That after a version was played to the jury, another
5 set was placed onto the records, *A DIFFERENT SET.*

5 Investigations into a technical analyst for these recording devices
6 will produce relevant and material factors that would have altered
7 the jurors opinion of why certain answers were answered the way
8 they were. The interrogation recording was played to the jury which
9 lasted only one hour and fifty-five minutes, when the entire inter-
10 rogation was over three hours and forty-five minutes. Investigations
11 would in fact make showing that the defendants answers were altered
12 from one answer to the other on the printout of exhibit 49A in com-
13 parison to the exhibit 49 (CD disc of the actual interrogations
14 recording) *WHILE A CAM-CORDER CASSETTE EXISTS, BUT IS UNSHOWN.*

15 This act would constitute manufacturing false evidence. The
16 jurors could then be deposed as to their memory of what was played
17 in this recording, and would prove that the wife of the defendant
18 was removed from the recording, that the defendant owned a blue
19 pinto was removed, that numerous factors of hallmark custodial
20 was removed, that defendant tried to end interrogation and was
21 refused freedom to leave or end the interrogation, *AND FORCED TO POLICE*
22 *STATION.*

23 B) There was a item left behind by the killer, that the
24 DDA prosecutor presented to the jury, as proof of the struggle
25 that the victim put up with when she was killed, and this item
26 was located on an undisturbed area of the crime (right next to
27 the victims head on the sheets)

Expansion 4

1 The prosecution made clear that this evidence was left
2 behind, by the way the crime scene was found and the circumstances
3 of the murder. The state lead expert testified that this item
4 could and would have DNA located on it, but that he had not conducted
5 this type of examination himself. The item was a watch band pin,
6 that did not belong to the victim, while the respondent here
7 indicates that this victim collected watchband pins as a hobby,
8 then suggests that even if there was another DNA located on this
9 item left behind by the [killer] and belonged to someone other
10 than the petitioner was mere speculation. This item was located
11 and carried,

12 i) DNA properties which could be collected and compare to
13 codis data, and may have come back to the man who had
confessed of this crime.

14 ii) This information was made available to the defense attorney
15 before trial, an inquiry into why he did not examine
or investigate the evidence or have it forensically tested.

16 iii) This item was located on the victim's upper right side
17 of her head, and would have been left behind by a right
18 handed person that wore their watch on their left wrist.

19 iv) That the prosecutor knew the DNA qualities and did have
20 this item examined for DNA and withheld the results of the test.
BECAUSE THIS DNA DID NOT MATCH PETITIONERS.

21 Simple testing of this item would produce a different DNA type
22 than the petitioners, and may come back matching their confessor.

23 The fact this item was withheld from the petitioner when
24 he asked for all the evidence, speaks volumes, and when it was
25 placed in front of the jurors as [the] watchpin the killer left
26 behind, certainly weighed into the jurors collected views in
27 this case, and if this item's DNA would have been shown, the
jury would never have voted guilty.

Expansion 5

1 The results of simple forensic examinations would convince
2 the court to order an evidentiary hearing on the results this
3 item would have revealed.

4
5 C)The state collected from the crime scene, and revealed
6 in their list of DNA items located, one red-hair with the entire
7 root bulb structure fully intact. This hair was collected from
8 the victims torso area, and did not belong to the victim. Rita
9 Cobb was salt and pepper hair colored. This hair did not belong
10 to the petitioner either, he is blonde. The crime scene presented
11 such a struggled atmosphere, where the victim was found strangled
12 and a ligature was wrapped around her neck. The prosecution
13 presented an hypothetical atmosphere, where this [struggle] occurred
14 and detailed how the struggle lasted for over three minutes.
15 It is more than reasonable to believe that in this struggle,
16 the victim at some point attempted to fight off the perpetrator
17 and in this struggle for her life, managed to pull several hairs
18 from the assailants arms, or facial area, and subsequently pulled
19 out one hair with the entire root bulb structure attached.

20 The red-hair with the root bulb attached, and this item would,

21 i) Prove another DNA profile than the petitioners, and
22 possible coming back to match the confessors.

23 ii) This item was given to the defense attorney, but
24 the color was withheld from the petitioner, and the
25 attorney had told the petitioner this item would
26 be tested, and at some point did tell his client that it had
27 been tested and that they were ready for trial.

28 iii) The state expert was questioned about what was located
29 when processing this scene, but withheld that they
30 found a red-hair with the root bulb fully intact.

Expansion 6

1 A simple examination and forensics test will prove
2 this item that was located on the victims nude body, very material
3 and relevant when compared to the petitioners DNA profile. Being
4 that this item's DNA would be different than petitioners, and
5 proving this fact to a fair minded fact-finder, they would not
6 vote the defendant guilty when the other states expert testified
7 that the petitioners DNA that was located on this crime scene
8 was at least one and a half days to several days older than the
9 actual murder. CRIMINALIST JONE, DR SAUKEL

10
11 D) The state collected DNA from a itemn that was located
12 on this crime scene, under the bedroom quilt, and after cutting
13 a small portion of this evidence, they destroyed the evidence
14 remaining and discarded it before letting the petitioners attorney
15 examine it. The remainder of the desk blotter was not
16 examined by the attorney at all. The attorney told petitioner that
17 this item would be, and had been examined and tested, [but was not.]

18 Testing of this item would have proved relevant and material
19 which would have affected the reasoning of the jurors opinions
20 of the evidence,

- 21 i) By showing that there was more than just two DNA's located
22 on this item.
23 ii) That after thorough examination, would have shown this item
24 was damaged and destroyed, where a larger portion of the evidence
25 is now missing. (REASONABLE DOUBT)
26 iii) When the forensics on this item reveals who's DNA actually
27 is on it, will undermine the prosecutors case, saying that
petitioners DNA was the only one found in this case.
iv) Simple examinations would prove relevant and material facts.

Expansion 7

1 The examinations by forensics would have shown more than two DNA's
2 located on this item, and while the prosecutor witness statement
3 that this item had both petitioners DNA and victims DNA and that
4 these DNA's were placed under a mutual circumstance. The expert
5 did not testify about the evidence itself, because they did not
6 examine the evidence, only the DNA that was collected from it on
7 that tiny portion that was cut free from the large blotter. They
8 did not test the evidence to [any] degree, and could not say for
9 historical certain there was no other DNA's located on this item.

10 Testing and examinations on the tiny remaining portion of
11 this evidence will prove relevant and material to the facts.

12 E)The state collected a wire litigature from the victims
13 neck, and produced this evidence to the defense attorney, who declared
14 that he would have this item examined. The state presented this
15 item to the jury and explained how this weapon was used, and inferred
16 that it was the weapon petitioner used. The state prosecutor withheld
17 the DNA report from this item, possibly because the DNA that was
18 collected from this item, did not belong to [petitioner]. The facts
19 that the defense attorney agreed to have this item forensically
20 examined, and did [not] after he had already told the petitioner that
21 it had been, raises serious questions about the material value of
22 the DNA that is located on this item, where further examinations
23 would prove,

24 i)That this item that was used to kill Rita Cobb was not touched
25 by the petitioner to any degree.

26 ii)That there was no possible way this item could be used and
27 not have the perpetrator leave some sign of forensics DNA on it.

Expansion 8

1 iii) That the DNA that is located on this item does not belong
2 to the petitioner.
3 The examinations of this item would prove relevant and material,
4 historically incredible because the state presented this item to
5 the jury as if to suggest that the petitioner had used it to kill
6 the victim. The state presenting this to the defense attorney, and
7 the suggestions that this item would be examined, and then telling
8 the petitioner it had, when it had [not], would support, that the
9 state knew the DNA located on this item did not belong to the petitioner.

10 F) The state presented witness John Sullivan that testified
11 differently than his friends that were at the same party, and his
12 own initial statements when first given. Then saying that he had
13 fallen asleep before Rita Cobb left his drinking party around
14 9:30 p.m., which is exactly as everyone else had made statements
15 of, that John Sullivan had fallen asleep around 9:30 p.m..

16 Bruce Nash had gone to the party with his girlfriend, Cynthia
17 Nash (now), and after John had fallen asleep, he and Cynthia left
18 the party. ^(at 9:15 - 10:00 PM) On the stand though, John Sullivan testified that
19 he witnessed Bruce Nash giving Rita Cobb a ride home that night.
20 (RITA LEFT PARTY AT 10:30 PM.)

21 John's testimony came just after Nash's testimony, where
22 Nash testified that he did not give the victim a ride home, now
23 afterwards Sullivan says he witnessed Nash giving her the ride.

24 This testimony was coerced, admittedly by Sullivan, and
25 an investigation in the following,

- 26 i) The accounts of Sullivan for possible financial compensation
27 for his [different] testimony.
 ii) Interviews with John Sullivan and his wife separately to
 determine when the state prosecutor convinced them to testify

1 differently than their previous statements to the det actives
2 just a few days after the murder.

3 iii) Look into the counties compensation payout fund account for
4 state witnesses stipen.

5 The fact that the court argued with the defense attorney as Bruce
6 Nash was testify ing, telling the defense attorney that ["The]evidence
7 that will be in this trial is that Rita Cobb did not do as she
8 said she was going to do (go to a bar) and the evidnece that
9 will be inthis trial is that she did not go to a bar, and that she
10 went home,[we] have witnesses to testify to this""[]

11 Not knowing what Sullivan would testify to, because he
12 had not yet been called, as Bruce Nash testified that he ,

13 a)offered Rita a ride home that she declined.

14 b)left the party before she left

15 c) That she had told him she was going to a bar,not home.

16 When this evidence had not been produced into the trial yet of John
17 Sullivans testimony, the only possible explanation for Sullivan's
18 different testimony was that there was coersion and influence from
19 the state team to convince his testimo ny to now be different than
20 everyone elses, and different than his previous statements as well.

21 G)The state intended to call witness Lori amaro, who had
22 previously filed a false report of sexual abuse against the petitioner,
23 but was dismissed for lack of prosecutors interests after preliminary
24 investigations. There was a restraini ng order placed on Lori by
25 petitioner after this false allegation, and records show that a
26 waiver of release was signed by Lorù Amaro. This person now had
27 interests in testifying of the alleged actions, and came with earmarks
of compensated witnesses.

Expansion 10

1 There is reason to believe this witness was also paid
2 to testify in this trial, and investigations would prove,

3 i) That she was in fact recorded accepting compensation for
4 her anticipated testimony.

5 ii) That there is recording material where the detectives primed
6 this witness for coerced and false testimony.

7 iii) That there is payout receipts for her anticipated testimony.
8 This witness was used to bolster the states case, suggesting that
9 prior bad acts would influence the jury. This witness had filed
10 the false allegation, which was investigated, and there was a waiver
11 signed by this witness, and a restraining order placed against her.

12 This witnesses testimony supported the states enhancement
13 into a L.W.O.P. scenario.

14 Investigations would prove relevant and material facts about this
15 paid witness.

16 H) The attorney had made several comments to petitioner
17 over the recorded phone service of globaltel, which is used in the
18 county jail system, and investigations into this system under #
19 #0903341068 to phone number (760)241-0413 between petitioner and
20 County public defender David Sanders would show, (BETWEEN 3/09 AND 3/12

21 i) That there was a conversation about the altered interrogation
22 transcript, where the attorney told the petitioner that
23 this transcript was an interpretation only and that if this
24 case went to trial that verbatim transcripts would be used.

25 ii) That the attorney told the petitioner that the investigations
26 had been completed, and petitioner and attorney were ready
27 for trial.

 iii) This attorney lied about the campaign flyers, and told his
client that only 3000 flyers were sent out.

Expansion 11

1 iv) That this attorney admitted that the 300 pages of discovery
2 he gave petitioner was all there was, [except] for DNA graphs.

3 v) That this attorney had been begged for the discovery before
4 and after the trial.

5 vi) That this attorney was told that the official visit right
6 was terminated by the county jail, and that he said he called
7 jail commander, and the commander told the attorney that
8 "if he did not like his decision to take it up with his boss"

9 The investigations into the above stated matters or relevant evidence
10 will make fair reasonable and historically correct facts, that petiti
11 oner was prosecuted by altered evidence, manufactured evidence,
12 paid and coerced witnesses, and appointed an attorney that conspired
13 with the other state officers, DDA Thomas, Detective Alexander, Public
14 defender Sanders, and the Superior Court judge Tomberlin to convict
15 the petitioner of a murder that he [is] factually innocent of.

16 Further investigations will unveil that the County District
17 attorney intentionally and meticulously calculated his mailing of
18 his campaign flyers to the entire county voter population where
19 he historically placed his reputation and the reputation of his
20 entire Cold Case team as he [PROMISED] the victims family closure
21 for a trial that was just a few days away from the mailings.

22 EXPANSION OF THE RECORD

23 Either on a party's motion or sua sponte, a federal court "may
24 direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional
25 material relating to the petition." Rule 7(a) of the rules governing
26 section 2254 cases in the United States District Courts (2020). see
27 Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 326 (1996); Ashworth v. Bagley, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27219, at *37 (S.D. Ohio March 28, 2002) (expansion
of record pursuant to habeas rule 7 is not governed by AEDPA sec.
2254(e)(2))

Expansion 12

1 restrictions on evidentiary hearing sought by petitioner who failed
2 to develop facts in state court;"Congress expressly modified§ 2254(e)
3 (2);Congress did not modify rule 7");McNair v. Haley,97 f.supp.
4 .2d 1270,1284,1286(M.D. Ala 2000)(Examinaing rule 7 relationship
5 to AEDPA new restrictions on evidentiary hearings in 28 U.S.C.§2254
6 (e)(2) and concluding that "rule 7 has not been supplanted but was
7 instead left in tact to functuion as it always has along side the
8 petitioner revised§ 2254".

9 "The materials t hat may be required include letters predating
10 the filing of the petition documents, exhibits, and answers under
11 oathe to writter interrogatories propounded by the judge.
12 Affidavits may also be submitted and considered as part of the
13 record".Although habeas rule 7 ,which embodies this "expanded record"
14 option,is discretionary,courts may abuse their discretion by failing
15 to utilize the procedure in compelling circumstances.The Supreme
16 court has indicated,and some federal courts of appeals have held,
17 that a habeas corpus petitioner's use of Rule 7 to expand the
18 record is subject to AEDPA's restrictions upon the granting of a
19 federal evidentiary hearing when the petitioner's default was respon-
20 sible for the state court's failure to develop the material facts.
21 Libberton v.Ryan,583 f3d 1147,1165(9th.cir.2009),cert denied,130
22 s.ct. 3412(2010)(applying the Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer,infra, to
23 find that rule 7 expansion of the records should have been allowed
24 because of Libberton"(exercise of diligence)
25 Habeas Rule 7 is a "simplifying procedure[]" designed to "minimize
26 the burden to all concerned"of the fact development process.Rule
27 7 pursues this goal in two ways.First,it permits the court to receive
all or at least some of the evidence relevant to the disposition

1 of the petition without a formal hearing-even, possibly, in situations
2 in which a hearing would be inappropriate or impermissible.
3 Ruine v. Walsh, 2005 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 14297, at *19 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July
4 20 2005) (explaining that applicability of section 2254 (e)(2)'s
5 restriction to rule 7 "remains an open question in this circuit"
6 and "declin[ing] to adopt [such] restrictions on ... Rule 7 applic-
7 ations") Ashworthy v. Bagley, 2002 U.S. District LEXIS 27219, at *37
8 (S.D. Ohio March 28, 2002); McNair V Haley, 97 f supp.2d 1270, 1284
9 1286 (M?D. Ala. 2000); Campbell v. Sabourin, 37 f. supp.2d at 603 (district
10 court ordered supplementation of record with
11 affidavits of witness, "[a]lthough the state court's record
12 was sufficient" so as to "clarify any ambiguity"). In appropriate
13 cases, a habeas corpus petitioner who has been denied a federal
14 evidentiary hearing may nonetheless establish a right to relief
15 on a fact-based claim by demonstrating that ,
16 1) evidence developed during discovery or through some other invest-
17 igative techniques justifies relief even absent incourt evidenti-
18 ary hearing proceedings conducted by petitioner, and,
19 2) The evidence may appropriately be placed before the court via
20 the "expansion of the record" device.
21 Second, it relaxes the rules of evidence by giving the court discret-
22 ion to admit virtually all evidence that,
23 1) "relates to the [pet]ition (Rule 7(a)
24 2) was in existence prior to filing the petition, or is tangible
25 or "real" evidence that was not created in anticipation of litig-
26 ation, or is comprised of or supported by sworn statement (Rule
27 7(b)) (Expanded record may include "documents [and] exhibits");
Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 308-10 & nn18, 19 (1995)
3) is not already part of the record of prior proceedings in the
case

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

1
2 The Criminal Justice Act does not define the phrase "necessary
3 for adequate representation". Nor does the Anti-Drug Abuse Act define
4 the analogous phrase "reasonably necessary". Taken together with
5 established habeas corpus jurisprudence, however, the language of
6 both Acts suggest that Congress intended to provide prisoners, upon
7 request, with all resources needed to discover, plead, develop, and
8 present evidence determinative of their "colorable" constitutional
9 claims. see *id.* (O'Connor, J. concurring in judgment in part) (goal
10 of counsel appointed under Act is to ensure that "first petition
11 adequately set forth all of state prisoners' colorable claims
12 grounds for relief") In *Re Braxton*, 258 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2001)
13 (district court granted petitioners request pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
14 848(q) for funds for DNA retesting of states physical evidence
15 as "reasonably necessary to support Cherrick's claim of actual
16 innocence...and innocence as a 'gateway' to proving other constitut-
17 ional claims, ...as well as a potential clemency petition; *Patrick*
18 *v. Johnson*, 48 F.Supp.2d 645, 646 (N.D. Tex. 1999)

19 Congress and the Court have both recognized that habeas
20 corpus claims often turn on factual questions, and that "The procedures
21 by which the facts of a case are determined assume an importance
22 fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law
23 to be applied") *Wingo v. Wedding*, 418 U.S. 461, 474 (1974) (quoting
24 *Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). see e.g. *McFarland v. Scott*,
25 512 U.S. at 855 (Purpose of habeas corpus procedures is developmental
26 of possible claims of factual innocence") *Wingo v. Wedding*, 418
27 U.S. at 468 ("More often than not, claims of constitutional detention
turn upon the resolutions of contested issues of [FACTS].

1 Both have insisted, therefore, that full development of determinative
2 factual questions precede the final adjudication of habeas corpus
3 claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006) Rule 8 of the Governing section
4 2254 cases in the United States District Courts (2010); Jackson v.
5 Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) ("A federal court has a duty to
6 assess the historical facts when it is called upon to apply a
7 constitutional standard to a conviction obtained in a state court");
8 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82-83 (1977) (Habeas corpus petitioner
9 is "entitled to careful consideration and plenary processing of
10 [his claim], including full opportunity for representation of the
11 relevant facts" (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969))

12 And both have made a variety of fact-determinative procedures
13 available to habeas corpus petitioners, including evidentiary hearings,
14 discovery, and even if an evidentiary hearing is not available
15 or required expansion of the record to include documentary evidence.

16 see 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006) Rule 8 of the governing section
17 2254 cases; Wingo v. Wedding (citation omitted); Rule 6 of the Govern-
18 ing section 2254 cases; Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969)

19 The policies favoring provisions of financial services
20 are even stronger in capital cases because the "finality" of death
21 and "it's" qualitative difference from a sentence of imprisonment,
22 however long "magnifies the "need for reliability" and accordingly,
23 the need for reliable fact-determinative procedures.

24 As Chief Justice Merritt of the 6th Circuit stated in a letter
25 drawing attention of District Judges in the circuit to the
26 support -services provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act;
27 "[T]he Act... provides that "investigative, expert or other
services [which] are reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion of the defendant, whether in connection with issues

1 relating to guilt or sentence "21 U.S.C. §848(q)
2 (9)(recodified at 18 U.S.C. §3599(f)), Shall be authorized
by the court..

3 Both in noncapital and capital cases, the prisoner must accompany
4 the ex-parte requests for funds for investigative, expert, or other
5 services with a memorandum, an application to proceed in forma
6 pauperis, an affidavit of indigence, and other supporting documentation.

8 REQUESTED EXPANSION AND ANTICIPATED RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL FACTS

9 The interrogation recording devices

10 After preliminary investigations, historical facts will
11 make showing that there were answered questions where the answers
12 were altered, and that petitioners attempt to invoke miranda was
13 ignored, attempts to leave were denied, and attempts to end interrogatio
14 were refused, while petitioner was interrogated outside his 4th
15 Amendment rights. This manufactured evidence and false and illegal
16 evidence was used to influence the jurors opinions of the evidence,
17 and that defense attorney, prosecutor, lead investigator, and judge
18 conspired to alter and hide evidence for this territorial conviction.

20 The DNA located on the watchpin

21 After thorough investigations and DNA analysis, this item
22 will prove to not have the petitioners DNA located on it, and quite
23 possibly may match that person Gregory Randolph that confessed
24 to this murder. This item was left behind by the probability of
25 the circumstances of the crime, and the direct scene, that it
26 was left by the person who historically killed Rita Cobb, and prove
27 that petitioner did not

1 The red-hair with ther entire root-bulb attached DNA profile

2 After thorough investigations this itemn that was located
3 on the victims nude body, will show the DNA profile does not match
4 petitioner. The state p:resented a crime scene that an actual struggle
5 occured, and reasonable inferences would lead one to believe that
6 a hair that was pulled out by the entire roots was located on
7 the nude body, that did not match petitioner would also not match
8 the victim leads one to historically believe the crime was committed
9 by someone other than the petitioner.

10 The wire litigature that was located on the victim, the murder
11 weapon

12 After thorough investigations, this item that was located
13 around the victims neck, will provide a different DNA profile than
14 the petitioners, and will not have the petitioners DNA located
15 on it. The result of this investigation would historically prove
16 that petitioner did not touch or attach this item to the victim,
17 and possible would come back matching Gregory Rabndolph (the man
18 who actually confessed to this crime)

19 The desk blotter that was collected ,but destroyed

20 After thorough investigations, this item will prove that
21 it was in fact destroyed, and that the majority of this evidence
22 was discarded. The remainin#g part of this evidence will show there
23 are more DNA's than just the victim and petitioner. This investigation
24 will historically prove the evidence was damaged and destroyed.

25 The alleged witness Lori Amaro + KYE SUN DELGADO

26 After preliminary investigations, and possible interviews,
27 the witness was hired to testigy, and compensated for their alleged
testimonYES

1 The investigations will also show this witness was in fact mentally ^{LORIAMARO}
2 complicating when her alleged prior rape occurred, and that she
3 had falsified her report to get even with petitioner for his moving
4 out and not marrying her as promised. Investigations will show there
5 was an investigation and ^{their} reports ^{were} discarded, and that she ^{LORI}
6 had personally waived any rights to this accusation. Investigations
7 would show that she had bragged about her false report to several
8 of her friends, in a laughing manner. ^{WHILE DELGADO WAS DEPOSED.}
9 This investigation will show the state was willing to hire witnesses
10 to convict.

11 The witness John Sullivan

12 After preliminary investigations and background checks
13 into banking accounts, will show this witness was coerced to testify
14 differently than his previous statements or anyone else for that
15 matter, in an attempt to hide the fact the victim Rita Cobb had
16 went to a bar that night she was killed. Investigations into phone
17 recordings and conversations, the state coerced this man's entire
18 testimony to confuse the jury of the facts, in an attempt to hide
19 the [indica reliability] of Gregory Randolph's confession that
20 he had met Rita at the bar on that Friday Night after eleven at
21 night, took her home and killed her because she was sexually turned
22 off by Gregory. The state declared that there was no mutilation,
23 but the victim's blood smears on the bedroom door jamb and hall
24 way indicate otherwise, ^{WHILE A WIRE WAS RAPPED AROUND VICTIM'S NECK.}

25 The public Defender David Sanders

26 After preliminary investigations, and review of telephone
27 calls, evidence that this attorney did in fact agree to test all
the evidence, that he admitted the evidences [were] tested, that

1 he had told the petitioner that he had release all the discovery
2 (the 300 pages), and that he had been ready for trial. That if
3 this case went to trial, that verbatim transcripts would ~~be~~ used,
4 and that petitioner repeatedly begged for the discovery to this
5 case form months, and again after the trial was over, "to please
6 give the petitioner all the discovery," and that he did not.
7 Investigations would prove this attorney did not examine or test
8 one piece of evidence to [any] degree. Investigations will show
9 this attorney hid the facts of the case, evidence for the case
10 from his client to prevent from having to investigate, and that
11 rights were forfeited carelessly and recklessly injuring petitioner.
12

13 Finally after preliminary investigation

14 A fter preliminary interviews with the jurors, information
15 that the jury was coerced and forced into a verdict, and that there
16 was a heavy presence of influence on votes. That the jurors understand
17 ing of the courts instructions were influencial. Information that
18 this jury was not shown the states exhibit 49 or 49A to any credible
19 degree, and that matteres were palyed to the jury. That they believed
20 the transcript they were played was in fact accurate as they were
21 sworn by the state detective, and original media as the courts
22 had instructed them, and the court forced them into a verdict after
23 three seperate declarations of hopelessly deadlocked points inthe
24 deliberation.

25 Finally, the results of this investigations will prove
26 the evidence that was used to influence the jury was manufactured,
27 and false. That evidence was tampered with, them presented to the
jury as factual and accurate.

1 That after the DNA hit on CODIS in October of 2008, of petitioner
2 to this scene, the prosecutor was told by Criminalist Jones, and
3 Dr. Saukel that ~~the then~~ ^{the then} DNA was older than this case by at least one
4 and a half days, up to several days before the crime had been committed
5 ^{DR. SAUKELE "UP TO 1 1/2 DAY BEFORE" CRIM. JONES "SEVERAL DAYS PASSED, THEN SHE DIED"}
6 The County District Attorney's team then set out to
7 further investigate. In these investigations they illegally interr-
8 ogated petitioner for numerous hours in two separate locations,,
9 then altered that interrogatrion recording, switching answers from
10 one to another. When they then presented it to the defense, they
11 withheld that over 23 pages were missing, and that they had altered
12 petitioners answers. Petitioner made request for discovery less
13 than a week after arrest, and finally after three months was given
14 less than 10% of the evidence in this case, and was expected to
15 make logical and intelligent decisions from those pages that were
16 withheld. Petitioner immediately told the attorney that the transcript
17 was altered, and areas of the interrogation were missing. Petitioner
18 at that time did not even know there was another set of transcripts,
19 which now have become, after Bar Association intrusion, petitioner
20 was correct all along. That the transcripts were altered. The
21 attorney continuously lied to petitioner, about the evidence,
22 the investigations, what evidences existed, and [pretended] to def-
23 end the petitioner through calculated and reckless tactics. The
24 attorney told the petitioner the case had been ready for trial,
25 and set dates. That same month April 2010, the County District
26 Attorney, after the dates had been set, sent out memo reminders
27 to the entire county's population there 1) was a trial being held ^{FOR} ~~MELCASK~~
soon for a cold case 2) that he personally promised the victims
family closure in that trial 3) that he was running for new county
re-elect County District Attorney.

1 The attorney was not even the one to tell the petitioner
2 this mailing occurred, that showered the entire mailing population
3 of the county, where three different flyers were mailed to their
4 homes, post office boxes, and businesses in a months span of time.
5 Which might I add that this person used the federal post office
6 to commit a crime of constitutional magnitude. It was the cops in
7 the jail. Petitioner's attorney's response once confronted by petitioner
8 was that he tried to comment through the local news paper, but that
9 they would not listen. Petitioner was the one who wrote the suit
10 from a cell, after getting the courts permission to sue and trans-
11 port. The trial was cancelled and rescheduled. The evidence that
12 was given to the petitioner in the beginning of this case, did have
13 at least two separate police reports of Sullivan and Nash, that
14 revealed that Rita Cobb had been at their party on the night she
15 was killed. The other reports were withheld. The motion to recuse
16 the County's District attorney's office was fumbled by the attorney
17 at a critical point in this case, and the attorney general was
18 not served ^{at all}, leaving the only opposition to the motion was
19 the District Attorney's office alone [a prejudicial and politically
20 connected party in this case]. The motion was not heard, it was
21 a chambers meeting, off the record, then a continuance was granted
22 and motion denied.

23 Knowing the DNA that belonged to the petitioner was
24 older than the crime by up to several days before she was killed,
25 the prosecutor then coerced the witnesses testimony, or with the
26 courts assistance interveined with the probing of defense. The entire
27 team for some unknown reason other than to convict this case, again

Expansion 22

1 alter the 113 page version of the interrogation recording, where
2 the answers that were altered on paper were now synthisized from
3 another place in the audio recording into their new homes,wh ere
4 answers were altered from yes to no, and no to yes, among other
5 areas.All the incriminating factors of MIRANDA were removed, even
6 the petitioners attempt to end the interogation, invoking MIRANDA
7 and trying to leave but was not allowed. This team of prosecutors
8 then (attorney included) presented this altered version to the
9 jury wh ere petitioners wife was removed from the recording, fact
10 that petitioner owned a b.lue pinto was removed while state presented
11 witness that saw a silver binto at the crime scene, not blue; then
12 told the jury what they were go ing to listen to was an accurate
13 copy of the actual recording. The state then presented states exhibit
14 49 and 49A on t he records, after the prosecutors lead investigator
15 told the jury that this recording and visual transcript they were
16 going to listen to was [accurate]. After the jury listened to this
17 recording the courts then interveined and displayed it's authority
18 telling: ~~the~~ jury what they had listened to was [an original media]
19 of the actual recording, and they as jurors should use what was
20 plat yed to them to decide what the petiti'ners answers were
21 to detectives questions as [reliable].

22 After investigations, proof that the jury did not listen
23 to the exhibit 49 or 49A vesrion of the interrogation, that the
24 witnesses did not tell the truth, and were compensated for their
25 testimony, possibly the states only way of proving petitioner was
26 an interested party to this case. Because the only forensics evidence
27 or reliable proof the petitioner was ^{AT THE SCENE} in this case was

Expansion 23



1 The DNA that was collected from inside the victim and had been
2 there for over one and a half full days before the victim was
3 killed and up to several days before she was killed.

4 Evidence was withheld from petitioner to prevent him
5 from defendaing himself of this case, where the relibale confession
6 was withheld, the witnesses last words to Nash were withheld, and
7 the petitioner. was forced into a prejudicial trial in a community
8 where every juror had been primed with the County District attorney's
9 campaign propaganda. The flyers he personally mailed into the homes
10 of every adult mind on the communities roster of prospective jurors.

CONFAMINATING THE ENTIRE POOL OF JURORS.

11 Investigations into this case that deliberatley and
12 intelligently ,through calculated and conspiratorial acts on behalf
13 of the entire state team, prosecuted the wrong person for this
14 crime. The state then presented this fake evidence to the petitioners
15 appellate attorney, to interrupt the petitioners appeal in the
16 state courts. The state, before this case was heard in the appeal
17 or state supreme courts, made a movie of this case, priming the
18 entire panel of judicial community with the altered facts, then
19 played it to the entire west coast through public broadcastings.

20 The evidence that was finally released two years
21 after the sentencing, and after the appeal show that this incredible
22 habeas corpus is factually provable, which need s further investigation
23 into the histoirical facts in this case, before the Magistrate
24 makes his recommendation.

25
26 PETITIONER REFUSES TO WAIVE ONE MORE RIGHT, OR TRUST ONE MORE STATE
27 OFFICIAL IN THIS CASE WHERE EVERYONE PARTICIPATED IN THE LIE




1 That the petitioner is in fact historically and factually innocent
2 of this crime.

3
4 PRAYER

5 Petitioner asks this court to grant an allowance of expansion of
6 the record regarding these facts listed above, and that an appointment
7 of an authorized federal investigator be either assigned or reim-
8 bursed for his investigations listed, That this person receive the
9 Federal district Courts Order s when investigating these matters
10 and that these matters be presented onto the records in support
11 of the petitioners colorable claim of innocense in his habeas corpus
12 before this court now.

13 Respectfully:

14 Date 2/1/15



15 _____
16 John Henry Yablonsky

17
18 AFFIDAVIT UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY

19 I John Henry Yablonsky am an adult and party to this
20 case, and swear under the penalty of perjury, that my finanacila
21 status has not changed, nor can I afford an attorney, or hire legal
22 assistance or an investigator .

23 I am currently granted forma pauperis in this case, and= an inmate
24 that is laymen on the law. I am asking this court to appoint an
25 attorney that will represent my interests, or grant propria persona
26 and an investigator, for the invcestigations of this request.

27 Date 2/1/15



Expansion 25